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Evolution: Selection for positive illusionsMatthijs van Veelen1 & Martin A. Nowak2
1Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WB,the Netherlands 2Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.Ask anyone with a driver’s license to rate their own abilities behind the wheel, and most peoplewill report that they are above average1. The same is true for self-­‐assessments of performance incognitive tasks2, of attractiveness3 (by men, not by women) and of the healthiness of ourbehaviour4: people typically place themselves higher on the ladder than they really are. In asurvey of 1 million high-­‐school students5, a solid 70% rated themselves as above-­‐averageleaders (versus 2% who thought of themselves as below average), and a spectacular 94% ofcollege professors possess teaching abilities that are above average — according to themselves6.Obviously they cannot all be right, but that does not make them dysfunctional or mentallyunhealthy. In fact, one way to get self-­‐assessments to obey some minimal aggregate consistencyis to restrict surveys to sufficiently depressed people7 (although this finding has beenquestioned8,9). Mentally healthy people blissfully suffer from what are called positive illusions:they overestimate their abilities, as well as their control over events, and they underestimatetheir vulnerability to risk10. Of course, one can overrate oneself too much, as do sufferers fromnarcissistic personality disorder or megalomania, but healthy people’s estimates of their ownabilities seem to start just a little above where they really are. Reporting on page 317 of thisissue, Johnson and Fowler11 describe a model that might explain why this is so.An obvious question is how overconfidence survives the process of natural selection. Theprevalence of rose-­‐tinted self-­‐assessments suggests that it might even be adaptive to beoverconfident — in contrast to schizophrenia, for instance, which is maladaptive butnonetheless exists in moderate proportions in humans. But how can it be adaptive to misjudgehow you compare with others? You would think that an incorrect assessment of one’s owncapabilities can induce only misguided decisions.One suggested explanation is that there is a benefit in having others think that you’re great. Andas there is no better way of being a strong persuader than firmly believing in yourself, this wouldlead to an upward bias in how people perceive themselves compared with others12. That maylead to a mistake here and there, but the benefits of the esteem of others could outweigh that(Fig. 1).Johnson and Fowler11 suggest a remarkable alternative explanation. According to their model, abiased self-­‐belief can actually lead people to make the right decision, whereas an unbiased self-­‐image would lead to a suboptimal decision. That sounds counterintuitive, but the key lies in theauthors’ departure from what could be called the ‘naïve economist’s’ idea of how humans arriveat decisions (‘naïve’ because many economists are not that naïve at all).The authors’ model envisages a valuable resource that two individuals can decide to claim ornot. If both claim it, then they will fight over it — which is costly for both. The strongerindividual will win the fight and gain access to the resource. If only one of them claims theresource, it goes to that person. If neither claims it, no one gets it.
Now if both contenders could simply assess the fighting strength of the other with perfectaccuracy, the optimal strategy would be a no-­‐brainer: fight if you are stronger, concede if you areweaker. But it gets interesting if the contestants have imperfect information about each other’sstrength. In this situation, contestants might back off because they think their opponent isstronger than he or she really is. A weaker contestant could then win a reward if she claims itwhile the opponent backs off.This situation can be dealt with within the realm of what economists call perfect rationality,which assumes that both parties understand all aspects of the situation, and that they correctlyanticipate the odds that the other player will claim the resource. But Johnson and Fowler suggestthat there is a short cut to the right decision. That short cut combines a simple heuristic — fightif you think you’re stronger — with a bias. If the resource is valuable relative to the cost offighting, then the risk of an extra battle here and there is outweighed by the gains made whenotherwise unclaimed resources are won, which makes overestimating one’s own fightingabilities worthwhile. If the cost of fighting is large relative to the value of the resource, then it isbetter to underestimate one’s own strength. The behaviors described by the authors’ model areactually more complex than described above, because the model also predicts that populationscan, for instance, evolve to a stable mixture of both over-­‐ and under-­‐confident people.Another evolutionary explanation is the following: overconfidence could reduce average pay-­‐off,but top performers will still come from the group of overconfident individuals. For example,overconfidence about roulette-­‐playing ‘abilities’ will lead to overall losses from this game, butthe best performers will have played often. Strong selection — as in ‘winner takes all’ — shouldfavour overconfidence.Johnson and Fowler’s study11 prompts a variety of interesting questions. The ‘winning strategy’(for low fighting costs) can be wired into the brain in two ways. The first involves a simpleheuristic plus overconfidence: only fight when you think you are stronger, but overestimate yourstrength. The second way involves perfect rationality without overconfidence: given someuncertainty, the winning strategy can be to fight opponents even if they seem slightly strongerthan you. Future empirical and theoretical studies might help to decide which of these twodescribes us best.It would also be interesting to establish a link between the authors’ findings and overconfidencein trading behaviour13, the willingness to buy overly complex financial products (which arethought to have led to the current crisis in the banking system), political decisions that lead towar14, and the evolution of fighting behaviour in animals15. Given that 94% of college professorsrate themselves as above average, there should be enough overconfidence around to tackle allthe natural follow-­‐up questions.
1. Svenson, O. Acta Psychologica 47, 143–148 (1981).2. Kruger, J. & Dunning, D. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77, 1121–34 (1999).3. Gabriel, M. T., Critelli, J. W. & Ee, J. S. J. Pers. 62, 143–155 (1994).4. Hoorens, V. & Harris, P. Psychology and Health 13, 451–466 (1998).
5. Alicke, M. D. & Govorun, O. in The Self in Social Judgment (eds Alicke, M. D., Dunning, D. A. &Krueger, J. I.) 85–106 (Psychology, 2005).6. Cross, P. New Directions for Higher Education 17, 1–15 (1977).7. Taylor, S. E. & Brown, J. D. Psychological Bulletin 103, 193-­‐210 (1988).8. Shedler, J. et al. American Psychologist 48, 1117–1131 (1993).9. Colvin, C. R. & Block, J. Psychol. Bull. 116, 3–20 (1994).10. Sharot, T. The Optimism Bias: A Tour of the Irrationally Positive Brain, New York: PantheonBooks (2011).11. Johnson, D. D. P. & Fowler, J. H. Nature 477, 317–320 (2011).12. Trivers, R. Deceit and Self-­‐Deception: Fooling Yourself the Better to Fool Others. (Allen Lane,London, 2011).13. Barber, B. M. & Odean T. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 261–292 (2001)14. Johnson, D.D.P. 2004. Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions.Cambridge: Harvard University Press (2004).15. Enquist, M. & Leimar, O. J theor Biol 127, 187-­‐205 (1987).

